Marx against Marxism, Marxism against Marx by Chukhrov, Keti et al.
266
Keti Chukhrov, Alexei Penzin, Valery Podoroga 
Мarx Against Marxism, Marxism 
Against Marx 
[A Talk with Valery Podoroga on Soviet Philosophy]
Keti Chukhrov (Research University Higher School of Economy, Depart-
ment of the Humanities, Moscow), Alexei Penzin (University of Wolver-
hampton and the Institute of Philosophy, Moscow), Valery Podoroga (In-
stitute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences)
 
1. Soviet Marxism or Soviet Marxisms? 
Keti Chukrov: I’m truly curious about the philosophical status of So­
viet Marxism in the context of Western Marxism. There are figures whom 
it’s difficult to imagine being integrated into contemporary critical 
thought or, especially, aesthetic theory. Nonetheless, the aesthetics of 
Lukács, though just barely, have made it into the corpus of modern aes­
thetics and epistemology, while the works of Ilyenkov, let alone Lifshitz, 
have not. These names are dogged by a certain marginality. In addition, 
the reading of Marx itself has led to extremely varied results in the Soviet 
and Western contexts respectively. For example, Ilyenkov distilled from 
Marx the very categories and concepts for which Western thought of that 
time found no use: the ideal, the universal, labor as a form of culture, and 
so on. Althusserian critical Marxism locates such categories within the 
early, humanist Marx. In effect, the range of models of social purpose that 
emanate from one source can be quite varied. 
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Valery Podoroga: You are right that Western Marxism and its funda­
mental ideas were formed outside of the influence of the most important 
representatives of what we call Soviet Marxism. Although, individual 
works by Evald Ilyenkov and Lev Vygotsky were translated by Progress 
Publishers and became fairly well known, for example among American 
and British Marxists. But, of course, being cut off for many years from par­
ticipation in the cultural and political processes taking place in the West 
had the effect of making our most advanced thought close in on itself, in 
its solitude, in the constant neurosis of waiting for new Party purges and 
repressions. Western (“Left”) Marxism has its own rich history, which, 
even if it was once connected with Eastern Marxism-Leninism, was so only 
in the sphere of cooperation among various Communist Parties. Our best 
minds of the 1960s could not take their eyes away from that dismal and 
distorting mirror of “actually existing socialism.” They hoped that sud­
denly we would get lucky and find ourselves beyond that looking glass…
Alexei Penzin: My questions relate to your recent lecture on Mikhail 
Lifshitz (Podoroga 2016). If I’m not mistaken, you distinguished four types 
of Soviet Marxism: Hegelian Marxism (primarily Evald Ilyenkov), nomen­
clatural­dogmatic (within the framework of the Soviet “ideological appa­
ratus”), scientific Marxism, and “leftist” Marxism. I don’t fully understand 
the last type; whom would it include? 
Valery Podoroga: I will risk taking up your time with an exhaustive 
answer. I will start with listing the different “Marxisms.” In the USSR at 
that time the most widespread form of “Marxism” was “Marxism­Lenin­
ism,” or the Party-nomenklatura, dogmatic form of ideology, serving as 
the window dressing or decoration for the one­party CPSU system. Into 
that we should include teaching practices in higher education, which were 
entirely defined by dialectical materialism, historical materialism, scien­
tific communism, and the history of the CPSU, purely Party-line ideologi­
cal disciplines. They, incidentally, were required for students in higher 
education. 
1. In terms of theory, Left Marxism does not represent anything in­
teresting or new. And, of course, it had nothing whatsoever to do with the 
pro­communist positions in theory that were taken by Karl Korsch and 
Georg Lukács. Having been formed within the Party-state nomenklatura 
system, it was the ideological-representative superstructure of that sys­
tem. If you like, each “leftist” in the nomenklatura wanted to be more 
Catholic than the Pope. I learned from Sergei Zemlyanoi, at one time part 
of the group of speechwriters for CPSU Central Committee General Secre­
tary Yuri Andropov and later his successor Konstantin Chernenko, how 
the upper strata at that time existed ideationally­ideologically and politi­
cally. The “left” group consisted of relatively young people, energetic and 
extremely ambitious, oriented toward a big career in the Party. They were 
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mostly graduates of the Komsomol (first secretaries of different types of 
Komsomol organizations). This group was quite influential and was op­
posed to another, similar one, with a different orientation, and was close 
to the broad humanitarian opposition to the regime (all those who had 
their “tongue in cheek”)—the liberal-nomenklatura Fronde, fairly cynical, 
well-educated, inclined toward managed reforms of the country’s Party 
leadership. 
2. Dialectical, Hegelian Marxism was represented above all by Evald 
Vasilyevich Ilyenkov, as well as younger colleagues who were close to him, 
among whom we must name Genrikh Batishchev and Viktor Vaziulin. The 
dialectical method was seen as a precondition of the development of new 
Marxist science, which should be constructed based on a single model—
Marx’s Capital. Not only did it have to simply present the ideal model for 
the organization of knowledge, but it had to become the universal sci­
ence—the science of sciences.
3. The strongest revitalizing influence on Marxist doctrine was ex­
erted by the existentialist movement that arose after the Second World 
War (Sartre, Heidegger, Jaspers, Enzo Paci, Ortega y Gasset, and many 
others). We could also add studies of Marx’s early works to that group, and 
the discovery of the humanist image of Marx and shift in individual coun­
tries of the Eastern bloc toward the doctrine of “socialism with a human 
face.”1 The Prague Spring of 1968 was intellectually prepared as an exis­
tential revolution, oriented toward humanist renewal, “humanizing” the 
socialism of old Marxist­Leninist dogmas. It is true that toward the end of 
the sixties the critique of the existential­humanist interpretation of 
Marxism gained momentum in the West (probably as a result of the fail­
ure of the reform process of the Czechoslovakian political regime).2 At 
that point the earlier formula, positing an optimistic exploratory horizon, 
“Marxism is a humanism,” began to be viewed as false and Utopian. 
4. Next there is scientific-structural Marxism, with which I was pri­
marily involved. It included the outstanding orators, true leaders of un­
derground critical thought, scholars and philosophers: Aleksander Zino­
viev (2002), Georgy Shchedrovitsky (2004, see also Khromchenko 2004), 
Boris Grushin (1961), and Merab Mamardashvili (1968). In parallel with 
that tendency, a kindred group of thinkers in France, led by Louis Althuss­
er (Étienne Balibar, Jacques Rancière, and others), proclaimed the theme 
of “scientific Marx” that was to revitalize dogmatic Marxism. The Moscow 
and Paris circles of Marxian philosophers resonated with each other in 
some ways, and learned from each other (for example, Louis Althusser 
1 To this we should add some works published in the sixties by Iurii Zamosh­
kin, Nelly Motroshilova, Erikh Solovyov, Piama Gaidenko, Iurii Davydov, Iurii Borodai.
2 The military invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact countries in 
 August 1968, which led to a crackdown on the broad civic opposition, who were de­
manding radical change from the pro­Soviet political regime. 
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and Merab Mamardashvili became friends [Mamardashvili 2016]). The cri­
tique of existential humanism of the Sartrean type began to grow in con­
nection with the strengthening position of structuralism and the intro­
duction into the human sciences of new linguistic and semiotic methods 
in France (Lévi-Strauss, Althusser, Foucault, and many others). 
Alexei Penzin: You have also voiced a rather provocative thesis, that 
in this way, “Soviet Marxism,” as such, in the singular, did not exist. After 
all, according to your hypothesis, it consisted—in the late Soviet period, at 
least—of several different formations, of which it is apparently impossible 
to distinguish one “main,” basic one. Such an analysis, which underscores 
the multiplicity of discourses and the richness of the individual variations 
contained in that multiplicity, is unquestionably of critical importance, 
insofar as it disrupts the image of a kind of dogmatic monolithic aspect 
which has insistently been imposed on these forms of Marxist thought. 
Though it would be interesting, also, to reflect upon what constituted the 
specificity and the contemporary relevance of Soviet thought as a whole. 
That question, in fact, is what this entire issue of our journal is attempting 
to answer. At the same time, to the extent that I understand the thesis of 
your lecture, the only “authentic” Marxism was the Marxism of Mikhail 
Lifshitz, which gives him a particular and symptomatic position in the 
landscape we are discussing. Lifshitz returns to the model of Marxism as 
a “ruthless critique” of all revisionist positions, but it seems that he does 
not offer any “positive” theoretical model. 
Valery Podoroga: What does it mean that Lifshitz doesn’t offer any 
positive model? One already exists—the model of orthodox Marxism. Ear­
lier on I had, one might say, no connection with Lifshitz, given that my 
generation did not consider that language, or those ideas, or all that old 
“Marxism­Leninism” something important and necessary for under­
standing the contemporary world. In fact we studied Marx, but it was 
rather from a post­Marxist perspective than from Lenin’s perspective. We 
knew enough about Lenin’s works to pass our exams on the history of the 
CPSU, while Marx we actually studied in some depth, but not as the social 
revolutionary and author of The German Ideology, rather as а European 
thinker who put forward (with the help of Hegel) important ideas in the 
domain of understanding the nature of consciousness and the forms of its 
functioning. As we continually compared our experience of reading Marx 
with European thinkers and the most important “post­Marxists” (Al­
thusser, Adorno, Lukács), we felt that we were in touch with what was 
going on in the world. The works of such philosophers as Aleksander Zi­
noviev, Vladimir Bibler, Merab Mamardashvili, Evald Ilyenkov, and Borish 
Grushin played an important part in this process. The general slogan was 
“Back to Marx”: to the real Marx, the scientific one, Marx the thinker! 
Down with Marxist-Leninist ideology, that was false consciousness, which, 
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from the sixties on, was revealed to be completely exhausted, empty, hav­
ing abandoned the belief in world revolution, belief in the possibility of 
building an ideal society of free people, a society of social justice! 
What was peculiar to Lifshitz’s position among “Soviet Marxisms” was 
that he reckoned himself an adherent of what was known as the “Left­Com­
munist Marxism” of the thirties (the pre­Stalinist period). His credo was: 
the critique of all kinds of “ideas,” “idealisms,” and “vestiges” of bourgeois 
society must be immoderate and ruthless, Leninist, or not exist at all. And 
that means that it should be based on the ideas and values of an ideal social 
order, unattainable in the present reality or in any foreseeable future. Such 
a society presents itself in the form of the Kantian thing­in­itself—as a 
regulating idea. Later on, “post-Marxism” would move in the same direc­
tion. Among those who knew this and “had a good feeling for” the critical 
direction of Marxism, I would name Ernst Bloch with his philosophy of 
hope, Walter Benjamin with the dialectical image, Theodor Adorno and 
negative dialectics, Herbert Marcuse with the new sensibility—a group of 
philosophers and theoreticians close to the Frankfurt School at the Insti­
tute for Social Research. And, of course, Sartre and existentialism/human­
ism. The slogans of the 1968 student revolution in Paris are purely Sartre­
an: “Demand the Impossible!”, “All Power to the Imagination!” and so on. 
Lifshitz appropriates fashionable “leftism,” proclaiming himself an 
orthodox Marxist, underscoring his old, close ties with Lukács and Left 
Communists of the thirties. Orthodox Marxism is that minimum core of 
fundamental positions of Marxism which cannot be denied, “improved 
upon,” or betrayed: they are established once and for all. Here I will quote 
an important passage: 
Even if [recent research had disproved every one of Marx’s theses], every 
serious “orthodox” Marxist would still be able to accept all such modern 
findings without reservation and hence dismiss all of Marx’s theses in 
their entirety—without having to renounce his orthodoxy for a single 
moment. Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical ac­
ceptance of the results of Marx’s investigations. It is not the “belief” in 
this or that thesis, nor the exegesis of a “sacred” book. On the contrary, 
orthodoxy refers exclusively to method. It is the scientific conviction 
that dialectical materialism is the road to truth and that its methods can 
be developed, expanded and deepened only along the lines laid down by 
its founders. It is the conviction, moreover, that all attempts to surpass 
or “improve” it have led and must lead to over-simplification, triviality 
and eclecticism (Lukács 1971: 1). 
The victims of Lifshitz’s critical interrogations were taken by sur­
prise in that it was he who made the choice, he who chose them, not they 
who chose him. And that makes sense, insofar as he acts in the name of 
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integrity and “clearing the ranks” and on behalf of the knowledge of au­
thentic science, of Truth itself. I will just note, however, that taking a crit­
ical stance toward whatever material is at hand is completely natural for 
any literary critic. But Lifshitz was not just a critic, he was a critic who 
based his arguments on the principles of orthodox Marxism, and his main 
purpose was to completely unmask his ideological opponents. 
Alexei Penzin: Thank you for that fully developed answer. I would like 
to clarify that in standard history of philosophy classifications, the term 
“post­Marxists” is used to refer to a later generation (the students of 
Lukács and Althusser, in fact—Ágnes Heller, Jacques Rancière, Alain Ba­
diou, Étienne Balibar, and others) […] Then again, I’m aware that such 
classifications are to a significant degree conditional, and your remark 
that a certain group of critical Soviet intellectuals read Marx “in a post­
Marxist perspective”—prior to the emergence of such a reading in the 
“Western” context—seems highly important. I think that the following 
hypothesis would be interesting: Lifshitz, with his Marxist orthodoxy, 
with all the immoderation and ruthlessness of his demands, without even 
suspecting as much, from today’s perspective looks, paradoxically, like a 
“post-Marxist” […] I mean that Lifshitz, if I may be permitted a joke, in a 
sense, “demanded the impossible” from Brezhnev! Also, you said that you 
used to feel differently about Lifshitz. In what way has your position 
evolved since then? 
Valery Podoroga: Earlier, as I said, I had no interest in Lifshitz as a 
philosopher. But then I was given a whole series of Mikhail Lifshitz’s post­
humously published work and began to read it […] Naturally, I began to 
take a profound interest in it, but at that point it was still in terms of 
reminiscence and biography—thinking about my own Soviet past. 
Thought exists in time, and can never cut across the boundaries desig­
nated for it by the period. And that was immediately noticeable, as soon 
as I began carefully reading the Marxist master’s texts: not the same 
problems, the questions, desires, the hopes are all different and don’t fit. 
None of it fits with my experience today or my theoretical orientations 
(leaving aside political orientations). 
2. “Doublethink” and Late Soviet Philosophy 
Alexei Penzin: What events or processes, in your view, represent the 
most important external conditions of the development of Marxist phi­
losophy in the society of the late Soviet period? 
Valery Podoroga: After a certain point, “doublethink” became a gen­
erally accepted solution at all layers of society. It cannot be said not to 
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have existed before, but it was only in 1972, when consultations began in 
preparation for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(the treaty was finally approved in 1975), that this doublethink received 
the backing of the state and became widely disseminated. What did it 
consist of? The fact that you can discuss serious problems of everyday life, 
and do so not only in the kitchen, or you can pretend that you are working 
for “that amount of money,” but you must not touch on political themes 
or the authorities. Since the government had a need for a fairly large 
group of specialist consultants for joint projects with the West, it found 
itself having to close its eyes to certain ideational or ideological inconsis­
tencies. The main thing was for words of protest and criticism not to be 
reflected or carry anti-Soviet resonance in the public sphere, but you 
could study whatever interested you as long as you keep up appearances, 
and avoid sticking your neck out or provoking the authorities. It was pos­
sible to get around all the formal rules, but again, you had to observe this 
pact with the authorities, an unsigned, but effective pact. The dissident 
movement did a great deal to destroy this “double” morality, this “double­
think,” but did not take into account (or did not want to take into account) 
this collusion between society and the government. 
In the late sixties the building of the Institute of Scientific Informa­
tion for Social Sciences (INION) of the Russian Academy of Sciences was 
constructed, and in the early seventies its holdings began to grow, restrict­
ed­access collections were opened with quite extensive access to Western 
periodicals. At that point there took place a wide­ranging institutionaliza­
tion of this political doublethink, undermining the foundations of Com­
munist ideology. The culminating stage was: one truth, the truth of “inner 
freedom”—for intellectuals, whose hunger for information is now fully ap­
peased, but they must keep silent; the other—for the proletarian masses, 
the workers and peasants. INION at this new stage of government ambigu­
ity and doublethink had to prepare reports, references, and annotations for 
the Party apparatus, that is, had to be an instrumental institutional intel­
lectual body for higher Party circles. Every section of INION had its own 
task and specialization. Restricted-access collections opened; doctoral stu­
dents and young research associates began to be allowed access to them. 
For me—a doctoral student at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute 
of Philosophy—permission to use the restricted­access collections was a 
real eye-opener. The world expanded a lot, and we began to know a great 
deal more about the world. Аnd young research associates of the Acade­
my’s human sciences institutes earned good money with their reports.
An unbelievable torrent of information began flowing in from the 
West. At our institute, a periodicals section opened—it would be unthink­
able now, but it’s also unnecessary—and all of the most important phi­
losophy and social science journals from many European countries ar­
rived there, as well as dictionaries and reference materials. For the com­
munity of humanists (students, graduate students, young teachers) 
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knowledge became a drug, we were dumbfounded by its availability and 
variety. It’s hard to imagine the kind of heroes of knowledge we had in our 
studies. An extremely modest life, at the library from morning until eve­
ning. Year after year. The most popular and extensive library holdings 
were at the Lenin Library, the History Library, and the Library of Foreign 
Literature, and, of course, at the Gorky Library at Moscow State Universi­
ty, the one on Mokhovaya Street next to the journalism faculty. Both the 
dissident movement and, in general, free thinking were in many ways de­
fined by society’s growing level of informedness. Freedom coincided with 
your desire to keep knowing more. As a participant in this feast of knowl­
edge, this incredible cult of the intelligent and necessary book, I think 
that everything that belongs to my generation that has meaning or value 
came about precisely due to this explosion of information. 
Here’s one more example of institutionalized (state) doublethink, in 
which I also participated as a future PhD candidate. In the seventies, 
GlavLit (the Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the 
Press) was allotted its own peculiar genre of scholarly work: “DSP” (Dlya 
Sluzhebnogo Polzovaniya, or For Restricted Use). After being published in 
those scholarly collections you could defend (presenting your dissertation 
at the State Commission for Academic Degrees and Titles). I published 
part of my thesis on Adorno’s “negative dialectics” in the journal Voprosy 
filosofii (Problems of philosophy)(I remember the section editor Armen 
Arzakanian with much gratitude), and the other part in a collection of 
DSP materials. Both very bad and very good scholars took advantage of 
those opportunities to the fullest extent. DSP materials were published in 
limited circulation, practically without any kind of editorial or publishing 
preparation, and without “attentive” censorship as well. And aside from 
specialists, nobody knew anything about them; such publications were 
marginal, pure hybrid creations of Soviet scholarly doublethink. It is true 
that they were acknowledged as superior with regard to Truth (they were 
something like philosophical samizdat, to which the Party leadership paid 
almost no attention). The important thing was that the ideational­ideo­
logical ritual was observed… 
Keti Chukrov: And can not it be that this explosion related to the eco­
nomic traits and conditions specific to socialism? Many remark the im­
portance of the economy of free, emancipated time under socialism, 
where there is a feeling of a “society of common ownership,” where vari­
ous sectors of time do not need to be privatized, where there is no private 
property (Vadim Mezhuyev, for example, has written a lot about this). At 
present, after all, there is also access to information, but our relationship 
to time and to knowledge has completely changed. 
Valery Podoroga: Unquestionably, for such profound engagement 
with philosophy we needed time, and a lot of free time. But it was not the 
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time of a free socialist society that had finally reached its maturity. On the 
contrary, it was the time of scarcity of freedoms and scarcity of basic hu­
man initiative, their suppression. In prison, particularly in solitary con­
finement, we possess the greatest possible amount of free time (unless, of 
course, we notice that we are in prison, and that we are deprived of many 
freedoms that people are endowed with from birth). Ironically, if there is 
an achievement of “actually existing” socialism, it in fact pertains to the 
time of its disintegration! Nothing binds you to great historical time, you 
are outside of it, together with the whole society, but on the other hand 
you have a lot of “minor” time that defines your evolution as a scholar and 
a human being. The friends of my youth and I made the fullest use of that.
Today, however, other generations, who were caught unawares by 
Perestroika, have not had that time, the “free time of the period of disin­
tegration.” They have needed to simply survive, to keep moving, not read 
books, not sit in libraries and not discuss abstract and extravagant sub­
jects, not collect household libraries… Of course, some are better off 
where free time is concerned, some are worse off, but it can no longer be 
found. But the main thing is we were living with just an inner feeling of 
freedom, and everything that was coming from the Outside (the environ­
ment, Party censorship, a shrill and empty ideology, pennilessness, the 
avalanche-like “deficit” in supply of basic everyday goods in the decades 
of late socialism) was rejected from the outset, was not interesting… 
Keti Chukrov: Soviet cinema depicts locksmiths and plumbers who 
analyze the production process and calculate algorithms of an enter­
prise’s economic growth. An important theme in cinema involves showing 
a worker as an agent who has a grasp of the whole production cycle in 
advance, and who can present his analysis to the Party leadership. The 
working class is shown to be something like the main analyst… 
Valery Podoroga: Once, while I was still a first-year student, I took 
part in a big sociological study that was made at the Likhachev factory in 
Moscow; I went there every day and gathered the results of research inter­
views taken from a select group of workers. I was particularly struck by 
one instrument mechanic who for some reason was working on a con­
veyor belt. His task was fastening the wheels on the axis of what would 
become a truck. He was unable to answer any of the interviewer’s ques­
tions, he just didn’t understand what they wanted from him. For example, 
I asked him his sex and he thought about if for a bit but just couldn’t bring 
himself to answer. He didn’t know the word “sex” in that sense and didn’t 
know the definition of “male.” Today that might be excusable and under­
standable in gender terms, but at that time? So the ordinary worker was a 
long way from being the main analyst. But in fact in the eighties a lot of 
pre-Perestroika films came out in which we see such workers or engineers, 
new leaders of production, what were called “Red directors,” but in the 
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nineties all these illusions of a great “just” and “effective” Reform were 
smashed to smithereens. Of course, we had what was known as the higher 
proletarian layer, the “shock workers” closer to the regime (miners, dairy 
workers, mechanics and machinists, combine operators and weavers). 
They were the ones who were awarded orders, distinguished titles, pay 
raises and apartments. I repeat, in order to preserve the socialist utopia, it 
was necessary to maintain the absolute (not relative) poverty of the whole 
society. And poverty is a form of equality. Thus the energy of Nietzschean 
ressentiment is weakened…
Alexei Penezin: I would like to know whether there was some overlap 
of the processes of the late Soviet “information explosion” you describe, 
and the socio-ideological situation that you, and many others before you, 
have called “doublethink,” with the very structure or “style” of the Soviet 
philosophical thought of that time? 
Valery Podoroga: I will try to answer in more detail. But unfortunate­
ly, this subject clearly lies outside the limited framework of our conversa­
tion. For the professional formation of the entire generation of philoso­
phers of the fifties and sixties, their relationship to Marx and Hegel played 
a defining role. For Merab Mamardashvili, the article “Analysis of Con­
sciousness in the Works of Marx” (1986) was significant for the further 
development of the subject of this thought and of the whole domain of 
issues that he used to formulate his theory of consciousness. What does 
Mamardashvili show us and on what is he able to rely in his analysis? 
First, however, a few points relating to how the material is presented. 
The principal device of the quasi-Marxist language of that time consisted 
precisely in finding in Marx’s legacy what had become a locus communis 
with the modern Western philosophical tradition, but would be absolute­
ly unacceptable to the orthodox ideological milieu of Marxism­Leninism. 
The name of Marx was used as a figure of speech that carried a double 
meaning—again, that same doublethink is at work here—with his name, a 
signal was sent out to two addressees: one signal to a narrow group of 
intellectuals, colleagues, and associates (to so­called “progressive soci­
ety”), аnd the other to those in power, to those who directly oversaw Vo-
prosy filosofii and acted in the role of censor. That article is particularly 
revealing because in it the play of language, addressed to two different 
addressees, stands out with particular clarity—the “mature” Marx (the 
“working,” preliminary manuscripts of Capital, at that time recently pub­
lished, are selected from his body of work) is juxtaposed with the psycho­
analysis of Sigmund Freud, but they are juxtaposed at the level of meth­
odological orientations (though there are flickering chains of associa­
tions, half-concealed mutual connections between or among categories 
and concepts from the existential­phenomenological and structural 
planes, leading toward Husserl, Sartre, Lacan, and so on). The implication 
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here is that Western (bourgeois) thought was only learning now to master 
what in Marxism had then been actively developing further over half a 
century. Mamardashvili is likewise “discovering” in Marx’s ideas what 
purportedly has always been there. That was a widely used device, attrib­
uting to Marx everything that made him an opponent of any kind of Party 
orthodoxy and Marxist-Leninist ideology, and avoiding crossing over to 
the side of Marx the “Marxist,” the ideologue of world revolution, the de­
fender of the proletariat. Marx is improved by Freud, or even Althusser, 
joining the two of them in the right doses, but within the perspective of 
the latter’s thought on the ideas of Jacques Lacan.
Alexei Penzin: I would like to clarify one point. Is this device of Ma­
mardashvili for you only a more complex model of the matrix of “double­
think,” which, according to you (and according to many liberal opponents 
and critics of Soviet society) dominated in the Soviet Union? Is not such 
an interpretation too sociological in its treatment of the philosopher’s 
thought, which is, broadly speaking, autonomous and, as you yourself 
have said, “underground”? 
Valery Podoroga: Fallacies in our work with conceptual (philosophi­
cal) language often prove a major obstacle to understanding what we are 
saying to each other. I mean to say that Mamardashvili saw this “double­
think” as a form that neutralized the ideological underpinnings of his own 
position. Although that doublethink was constantly under attack on the 
part of genuine Marxist­Leninists.3 “Singlethink” was attacking, “double­
think” was the defence. We should not reduce the concept of “double­
think” to an unambiguous epithet and see it in a purely negative light. 
Nowadays there is nothing even remotely comparable to the doublethink 
that was simply a necessity in those years, in order to live, to survive. And 
more importantly, to be always ready to passively resist. Doublethink, of 
3 The works of Evald Ilyenkov received official recognition, but that did not 
strengthen his position vis-a-vis the regime. Suslov, the main party ideologist, strongly 
disliked him. The story goes that there was even an episode where Ilyenkov was re­
moved, on Suslov’s orders, from the entry ramp to an airplane headed for a congress of 
Hegelians in East Berlin. Another example: I met Merab Mamardashvili in 1969, when 
he began teaching “Introduction to the Philosophy of Existentialism” to my year. After 
his return from Prague he had become the deputy to Ivan Frolov, editor-in-chief of 
Voprosy filosofii. I, then a graduate student at the Institute of Philosophy, would occa­
sionally visit him in his office. He once told me he had been invited to a conference on 
the Frankfurt School that was to take place in Budapest. Knowing that I was working on 
that very topic, he asked me for my copies of Adorno’s Negative Dialectics and the two­
volume edition of Max Horkheimer’s works. Some time later he gave me the books back, 
but with a sad look on his face. I distinctly remember what he said to me then: “So, now 
I’m restricted from travelling abroad.” They didn’t let him go to the conference after all. 
It seems Suslov disliked many talented Soviet philosophers, including Merab. 
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course, was not cynicism, it was not the nihilism of the ninteenth-century 
raznochintsy (literally, “people of miscellaneous ranks,” nineteenth-cen­
tury Russian intellectuals of non-aristocratic descent), it was an immune 
system developed through centuries of imperial and Stalinist serfdom 
within the social organism, a deformed and imperfect organism, but at the 
same time able to sustain itself with a great deal of diversification and ef­
fectiveness. Mamardashvili was not a virtuoso of Aesopic language, and 
nevertheless he made the fullest use of the institutional program that 
softened the ideological pressure from the CPSU on society’s intellectual 
elite. Doublethink was transformed into the increased complexity and the 
“inviolability” of the intellectual product.4 The range of Western thinkers 
whose names or work were drawn into commentaries, partial translations, 
or summaries expanded considerably. The complexity and difficulty of 
Mamardashvili’s thought was welcomed by young students and scholars, 
but was frowned upon by, for example, his colleagues. 
Alexei Penzin: I have another, more general question. I will remind 
you that the term “doublethink” was introduced by George Orwell—an 
anti-authoritarian socialist in his views, let us note—in the novel 1984 
(first published in 1948). Since that time, the societies of “actually exist­
ing socialism” have been depicted according to this canon that originated 
in literature: the reign of an alienated pseudo­rationalist Utopia that de­
grades individual freedom, spreads “doublethink,” cynicism, indulges 
base desires, and so on. In anticommunist discourse, the masses who in­
habit Soviet society, in contrast to the select few, consisting of the intel­
ligentsia or “elites,” who endure “doublethink” in torment, are depicted as 
unhesitantly accepting the bifurcation of existence into the “official” fa­
çade and the unsightly “actually existing” reality. They are refused the 
right to be free to think, to form their own independent relationship to 
Marxist doctrine. After Perestroika, the torrent of journalistic pronounce­
ments on Soviet “doublethink” was simply colossal—here, I’m talking 
about the perceptual experience of my post­Soviet generation. These un­
maskings—undoubtedly important for that period—formed the basis for 
the rise of a new official ideology that ascended the throne at the time of 
our intellectual and political formation. And insofar as we were also criti­
cally oriented toward dogma—but now facing this other, right-wing, lib­
eral, anticommunist one—it could not fail to arouse suspicion, especially 
among those who had become interested in the tradition of leftist thought, 
beginning with those same authors we were discussing here (Lukács, Sar­
4 My first publication in the journal Voprosy filosofii (Problems of philosophy) 
was simply staggering for my father when he looked at the contents of that issue. It 
opened with a leading, guiding article by the Party ideologist at the time, Mikail An­
dreevich Suslov himself, and in the section “Philosophy Abroad,” at the very bottom, 
there was my article on Adorno’s negative philosophy. 
278
Keti Chukhrov, Alexei Penzin, Valery Podoroga 
tre, Althusser, and others). Without question, your analysis is very differ­
ent in character and is based on what you personally have witnessed as a 
critical intellectual and scholar. But all the same, are you not made un­
comfortable by the proximity of the term “doublethink” to the basic lexi­
con of this new postcommunist (and anticommunist) ideology? And is 
there in fact any shortage of “doublethink” in the context of contempo­
rary capitalist societies, including the contemporary postcommunist real­
ity itself? Perhaps we ought not to exaggerate the value of this peculiar 
kind of socialist “doublethink” and should look for other languages and 
terms for the description of this historical experience? I assume that with 
regard to the questions that interests us in this conversation, the experi­
ence of “doublethink” figures only as a context of Soviet “Marxisms,” and 
it’s a whole separate theme. 
Valery Podoroga: Actually, is there really any sense in breaking 
through an open door, when it’s already open… What we call doublethink 
can also be defined in Kantian terms and called what, as everyone knows, 
he termed common sense. At that point we have expanded the concept of 
“doublethink” to such an extent that it loses all heuristic value. I would 
rather say that today there is no doublethink, no ideological cover for the 
values that have been lost, whether in the West or in the East. But after all, 
you and I study some of the conditions without which Soviet Marxism 
could not have taken shape. And one such condition for example, is the 
duality of the social individual that was directly expressed in the differ­
ence on which I continually insist: Marx against Marxism, Marxism against 
Marx. That is the rhythmic structure of Soviet “doublethink.” You now are 
talking about another kind of doublethink, the doublethink of the author­
ities and the political regime, its functionaries, while I am talking about 
“doublethink” as a defensive mimetic form used by any person with com­
mon sense. You are talking about the doublethink imposed by the author­
ities, but that is a mistake. It is we, as highly virtuous beings, who judge 
our own Authority from the point of view of moral and ethical criteria that 
it seems in some sense to lack. In Andrei Tarkovsky’s film The Mirror, 
there is an episode called “The Misprint”—a wonderful example of dou­
blethink that could be “found out” by the authorities, the Party’s inquisi­
tors were just waiting for such a chance. For a “misprint” one could even 
go to jail. Such were the phantasms left over from Stalinism, which turned 
out to be a source of new creative projects. In “Soviet kitchens” people 
were discussing questions of deep hermeneutics in the recently published 
novel Live and Remember by Rasputin, all sorts of recent events and an­
nouncements—and everywhere people were searching for the “second 
bottom”—the real meaning was always being hidden by the authorities. 
The regime proposes its game, and we, all of those who were still able to 
take interest in something and react to something, propose ours, a mirror 
reflection, you—this way, we—that way. In reality, the rule of the political 
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regime at that time had been deprived of this “doublethink” and had no 
need of criterial assessment, it acted crudely and stubbornly; what’s a dif­
ferent matter is that changes were already taking place there too, slowly, 
but they were happening. And the main thing in those changes was the 
weakening of ideological control over the population and society. It be­
came less and less effective without the use of force, and therefore the 
collapse of the ideational­ideological sovereignty of many government 
apparatuses, including the Central Committee of the CPSU, began. 
3. Metamorphoses of the Ideal 
Alexei Penzin: All the more interesting, given the atmosphere in the 
late Soviet society you describe, is the philosophical discussion of themes 
that at least on the surface level contradict that atmosphere, above all, the 
famous discussion about the “ideal,” one of whose main protagonists was 
Evald Ilyenkov. When reading Ilyenkov, one marvels at his crystal clear 
style, which varies in tone from strictly academic to popular-scholarly 
and “activist,” one grasps his superb knowledge of the history of philoso­
phy, of Marx’s texts, and so on. But sometimes he seems to be reproducing 
with greater depth, in its most polished and intellectually refined form, a 
certain collective Soviet philosophical discourse, the theory of labor and 
activity, above all. Was there something unique in Ilyenkov’s Marxism? 
Lifshitz, for example, criticized Ilyenkov in connection with the fact that 
in developing his conception of the social “ideal,” he undervalued the nu­
ances of Marx’s German terms —“Ideale” (ideal as in perfected) and 
“Ideеlle” (the term emphasises ideal as the opposite of material). But it 
seems that due to these terminological complexities, Ilyenkov managed 
to make some interesting discoveries in his development of the concept of 
the “ideal.” 
Keti Chukrov: Very often, Ilyenkov, and even more so Lifshitz, are ac­
cused of being in essence more concerned with Hegel than with Marx. 
After all, they rehabilitate such concepts of classical philosophy as “truth,” 
“objective reality,” “the universal,” “the ideal”—that is to say, those con­
cepts that posit a monism, even if it is dialectical, where the dialectic be­
comes an instrument of maintaining this unity; whereas Western philos­
ophy is either constructed on a dualism of thought and being, or resolves 
the question of the classification of matter by refusing such categories as 
the idea, the ideal, the universal and so on. The unity of thought and being 
and the belief in de­alienated spheres of social being in conditions of his­
torical socialism are the reasons why Althusserian Marxism does not trust 
socialism as a structure. To assert that alienation can be removed in the 
ideological struggle for unity, in the context of “Western” Althusserian 
Marxism, is considered idealism. How do we deal with this? Althusser, as 
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we know, held that historical socialism was, if anything, a palliative to 
capitalism, and that it was closer to capitalism than to communism. 
Whereas communism becomes established, not as a structure, but as a 
process of critique and communization. And for that reason the critical 
process in the conditions of capitalism answers to the tasks of commu­
nism more than an actually existing socialist society. That means that 
Soviet socialism as well as Soviet Marxism can be ignored, since it does 
not perform the work of communization either in theory or in practice.5
Valery Podoroga: You have raised some truly important questions. 
Without answering them, it is not possible to understand the role that the 
concept of the ideal played in the development of the Soviet version of 
Marxism.6 The first thing that needs to be immediately noted is that there 
is a single, common approach taken by all of the most influential Soviet 
Marxists, beginning with Ilyenkov and Zinoviev and continuing up to 
Shchedrovitsky, Mamardashvili and Lifshitz. This approach was often 
called the activity approach (deiatel’nostnyi podkhod) or the materialist 
worldview. And the legitimacy of its use gained a foothold in all discus­
sions about the ideal, and especially where there was a more comprehen­
sive survey of the theme of consciousness and knowledge. 
For example, for Merab Mamardashvili, this role was played by the 
theory of “converted forms,” but it was already an attempt to “sublate” 
subjective, activity-related forms of knowledge. To go outside the bound­
aries of Marxist propedeutics toward the systemic-structural Marx, and 
then beyond him toward Marx as a phenomenologist of consciousness. 
There was no longer a need for the tacitly assumed Subject of activity, and 
after all that is precisely the possessor of the “ideal,” that primordial form, 
necessary to construct the world and the self within it. Here we see a 
beautiful form of double construction: we construct the world, while it con­
structs us, and to the extent that this takes place simultaneously, the 
world is given a boost towards development. The Marxist subject suffers 
from not having enough of the “ideal” to grasp the universal, that is, to 
inscribe Nature, Society, and Consciousness in one horizon. He compen­
sates for this lack by what we call the dialectic, which no longer inspires 
trust as a universal method. And nowadays, in my view, it is perceived in 
the old Platonic rhetorical forms, or negatively.7
5 See Balibar (2015).
6 Consider: “Let us note incidentally,” Ilyenkov writes, “that in translations of 
Hegel’s works the adjective ideelle, meaning ‘ideal,’ is rendered as ‘idealized,’ in order to 
distinguish its meaning from Ideal, relating to the problem of the ideal, which, for He­
gel, functions as a problem of aesthetics” (Ilyenkov 1962: 222). 
7 Adorno’s “application” of this principle is outstanding. He created the theory 
of “negative dialectics” or the philosophy of disintegration, in which dialectics as a 
method can only be negative or cannot exist at all, there can be no syntheses or congru­
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Alexei Penzin: Your reading of the “ideal” as a kind of symptom of the 
lack from which the Marxist subject suffers is very interesting, one would 
like to learn more about it. But I don’t fully understand what you mean 
when you speak of this lack being compensated for by the dialectic, which 
allows the inscription of all spheres of being into a certain totality. After 
all, after Adorno there were some further shifts in the conceptualization 
of that theme. For example, the dialectic may be not only negative, and 
not founded on totalization, but can be conceptualized as an inherent 
paradox, a logical anomaly, expressing the social antagonism which can­
not be neutralized through simple “sublation”… On the other hand, that 
same Ilyenkov, in his later work “Dialektika ideal’nogo” (Dialectics of the 
ideal) (2009), it appears, understands dialectics not as a form of totaliza­
tion, eliminating differences, but rather as logic and way for the ideal to 
exist in activity—in a constant metamorphosis of de-objectification (sub­
lation), objectification (positing), and so on.
Keti Chukrov: I would add, nevertheless, that despite of the activity 
approach to dialectics, for Ilyenkov teleology and projectivity remain the 
central focus of his interpretation of the ideal. His understanding of the 
dialectic is entirely holistic, for the simple reason that any process of la­
bor is, for him, teleological. The difference between Ilyenkov’s and Lif­
shitz’s interpretations of the ideal was that Ilyenkov understood the ideal 
as a diachronically viewed social and labor process which, as it forms so­
cial consciousness, reveals itself through human consciousness as well. 
Lifshitz, on the other hand, considered the ideal to be the form itself of 
“objective reality,” which is possible even without the intervention of the 
Subject, without the participation even of social, much less individual 
consciousness. So that for Lifshitz, the ideal is possible outside of con­
sciousness, while for Ilyenkov it is not, though for him, consciousness is 
also itself a reflection of the diachronic, historical progression of society 
and labor. 
Valery Podoroga: Wherein lies the secret of the translatability of 
these two terms, Ideelle and Ideal, to which Ilyenkov, and, later, Lifshitz, 
draw our attention? In fact, Lifshitz’s position seems ambiguous, like al­
most everything he wrote. Being excessively dialectical, he is quicker to 
look for contradictions and inconsistencies than to propose a way out or a 
final alternative formulation of the problem. I think this is part of his 
strategy as a Marxist critic: to shake things up, to “mess up the party” in 
the words of Daniil Kharms, but not to correct or to conceal. In Russian 
philosophical jargon the definition of idealnoe (“ideal,” adj.) solidified 
encies, nothing universal; then the dialectic in in its negative status is seized by the 
energy of disintegration, and precisely in that sense it is, in Hegelian terms, real (real 
as disintegration, not as construction). 
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quite a long time ago, as did ideal (“ideal,” n.), and the German word that 
should be translated as idealizovannoe (“idealized”), coincides with the 
unfinished nature of the process, its non-transient state, what are called 
“third things,” or sensory-super sensory phenomena, and is a direct con­
dition of the functioning of consciousness. It is one thing when con­
sciousness is focused around a certain goal and the conditions for attain­
ing it, it acquires subjecthood, even becomes a Subject-in-action, and 
something else again when consciousness functions in its quality of con­
sciousness, without the ideal, that is, at the level of the vulgarly ordinary 
and natural limitations of everyday experience, outside of self-reflection 
and critical self­evaluation. 
Really, where you are right is in saying that the theory of reflection 
(according to Pavlov/Lenin/Lifshitz) is a universal ontology of the all­re­
flecting nature of matter, all things in everything, the one in the many, the 
many in the one, and so on. In М. А. Lifshitz we find a very extensive com­
mentary on the concept of the ideal. And this is far from random. Above 
all, Lifshitz wanted to return to the modern philosophical polemic, and a 
second thing, no less important: to clarify his views on the Marxist theory 
of reflection through comparing it with Ilyenkov’s theory of conscious­
ness (Lifshitz 2003). His understanding of the ideal has a fixed analogy, 
which he persistently uses, not attempting a more critical conceptualiza­
tion of it—and that is the mirror. The metaphor of the mirror is used in 
several conceptual tasks: first as an explanation of the theory of reflec­
tion: the world is objectified by means of its being reflected in itself, by 
means of its own mirror-like, mirroring aspect. Further on, the mirror is 
shown to be what may be called an ideal reflection, that is, it reflects with­
in itself the world and other mirrors, such as they are in reality: 
In order to acquire a consciousness corresponding to his nature as a con­
scious being, the human being needs an object that can serve him as a 
mirror of a certain group of phenomena, the bearer of their universal 
meaning. This thought is true, and it contains within it the only possible 
serious understanding of the theory of reflection in Marx and Lenin’s 
system of materialist philosophy. The theory of reflection is, in fact, a 
theory of the reflectivity of the most objective phenomena, their mirror­
ing capability (Lifshitz 2003: 262).
We can understand why the ideal, as it is presented in Ilyenkov’s and 
Mamardashvili’s studies of Hegel, is so in need of consciousness—in order 
to free itself from matter, and go outward toward the animate Subject (of 
action). For Lifshitz, as a Marxist critic of aesthetics, the theory of reflec­
tion also functions as the basis of a naturalistic (“Socialist Realist”) ap­
proach to the work of art. 
If we consider Hegel in the period in which he wrote Phenomenology 
of Spirit (1977) we note that he had already formulated the main idea of 
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the dialectics of the ideal (consciousness) at that time. We are always in­
side consciousness, and cannot exit precisely because it is real, in its be-
ing, it is what is real itself. Moreoever, this dialectic is not simply a meth­
od, but the very principle of development, which extends to nature as 
well—this is why the Hegelian dialectic is real. 
But what does real mean here? It means that consciousness for Hegel 
is real because it speaks. Consciousness is human speech, constantly un­
folding. This speech finds itself in continual gyration, moving forward, 
turning back, in other words it is language-in-action, in the act of self-
realization. Ilyenkov was deeply familiar with this defining role of lan­
guage in Phenomenology of Spirit (but for example, none of the most influ­
ential interpreters of Marx posed this question about language, or they 
simply ignored it) (Ilyenkov 1962: 222). After all, Hegelian language/
speech is a specific philosophical language, it is given in movement, which 
means that it must possess a kind of spontaneity that cannot be distorted 
by any phenomenon. In other words, the power of expression of this 
movement in language is great to the extent that nothing can disturb it, 
no expressible content. The total prevalence of expression over what is 
expressed. And this is responsible for its uniqueness, the uncommon, dis­
tinctive character of Hegel’s work, with all of its transitional moments in 
a concept that develops without stopping or pausing, perhaps only delay­
ing slightly before shifting to another level of self-reflection and intensi­
fying its movement. Concept-in-movement is the time of speech, which 
must not be interrupted or the world will perish… 
Modern Western thought (most often in manifestations of the An­
glo-Saxon philosophical tradition) accepts existence, void of conscious­
ness, consciousness without human beings, that is, essentially inhuman 
(machinic, for example). It can be filled in, structured, changed, studied, 
and it will always remain open and defenseless in the face of such en­
croachment. Mamardashvili, on the contrary, without discussing the role 
of language in the Hegelian dialectic, or examining the question of con­
sciousness as continuity of speech flux or becoming, notwithstanding de­
fines the self-consciousness of every kind of thinking being in utterly 
Hegelian terms, positing that authentic philosophizing is “consciousness 
out loud,” that is, a speaking consciousness, not a silent one. 
Very few have noticed (and it has never been discussed) that at the 
foundation of the doctrine of the “improved” or “good” Marx there lies a 
certain anthropological tenet—the indestructible, ineffaceable stamp of 
an early Enlightenment archaism—that is the figure of the Eternal Man 
(and the human). And that means that we are dealing, even in the most 
advanced Marxism, with variations on a position of a dynamic, that is, an 
extremely active Subject. And without it, as it turned out, Marxism, even 
in its renewed “post-” variations is still unable to exist either as a doctrine, 
an ideology, or, in the end, as an Idea. There is an assumption—you only 
need to be attentive in your reading—that the human being is what it is, 
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and that its evolutionary form need not be discussed, it is given in our 
reasoning from the beginning, as the Subject, whose new characteristics 
we are to receive. But to put in doubt the existence of Eternal Man is just 
madness and explicit, wild “Postmodernism.” Many French intellectuals 
can be accused of belief in this Eternal Man, although they deny it in their 
works and interviews. And this belief in Man is there along with the de­
construction of the image of the Sovereign, the Father, the Subject with a 
capital S that rules in mass consciousness, is an unending process. From 
there we get the theory of the Subject-multitude, in place of a certain 
solitary Marxist Subject, omnipotent and single-minded, the community-
multitude arrives, where subjectivity is not shrunken into a single, albeit 
ideal focus of action, but is divided into the horizontal interactions of 
those who exist con-jointly, concomitantly, synchronically (Bataille, Der­
rida, Nancy)
Alexei Penzin: To the extent that I understand your argument in its 
entirety, you believe that Soviet thought inherited from Hegel the model 
of a “speaking consciousness,” with its inherent anthropologism, which it 
was unable to get rid of. This argument, certainly, demands further dis­
cussion, that is, in the context of different interpretations of Hegel—from 
Kojève’s, it seems to me, very similar interpretation to contemporary 
“Lacanian-Hegelian” approaches (Kojève 1980). However, we can hardly 
get into those within the limits of this dialogue. But still, what do you 
think, were there in Soviet Marxism (or Marxisms) moments that might 
indicate a different logic than this “anthropological slumber” that has 
been criticized since the 1960s by Foucault, Althusser, and others? For 
example, Lifshitz himself—at least, in his work on aesthetics—comes out 
with a furious critique of bourgeois-individualist “subjectivism,” which 
distorts the “mirror” of our perception of the world, seeming to point to 
another way… I would also like to understand what other program (both 
theoretical and political) you see, with relation to the highly unsuccess­
ful—as what you have said implies—searches of late Soviet Marxism, 
which to some extent have been continued in contemporary radical leftist 
thought? 
Valery Podoroga: Your reference to an “alternative,” insofar as I un­
derstand it, can be translated into the question: And what is your Utopia, 
what is your philosophy hope, what do you believe in or not believe in? I 
hold, and have always held, to a moderate position and it has, it seems to 
me, been laid down fairly clearly in the foreword to my Apology of the Po-
litical (Podoroga 2010). You pose the question as if it were both “standard” 
and, of course, “beyond all suspicion,” and it is truly a question addressed 
to your belief. You doubt that such belief exists, but you need it. Where is 
the boundary that allows us to move from Belief to Action? Well, there is 
none! Where there is Action, there is no Belief. I call my action, which I 
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practice, the politics of knowledge, that is, the kind of knowledge, which 
within its own, no doubt limited, horizon, introduces a new vision into the 
world. And this knowledge is critical, insofar as it is undeniably superior to 
the pseudo-knowledge of the demagogues and court jesters in the media, 
the presenters and political functionaries. Here Knowledge has a correla­
tion with Truth, which strengthens our “faith” in Reason. But it is, of 
course, not just Faith and not “pure faith,” but a faith that brings itself 
into being by means of Truth, that is, acquired knowledge. The politics of 
this knowledge lies in the fact that it cannot be called into question by a 
larger Politics (meaning that it does not result from the struggle for pow­
er), its goal is Truth.
I am confident that we cannot nowadays discuss Marxism in the way 
that Ilyenkov and Lifshitz did, Merab Mamardashvili or Althusser, as if to 
continue their “Marxist discourse” in the contemporary, postmodern era. 
At the same time, I will note that they did not reveal their context due to 
considerations of censorship as well as simply because it was always obvi­
ous, “right before our eyes,” in the form of the everyday facticity of a soci­
ety in “mature socialism.” 
The problem is that the whole problematic of Marxism should be dis­
cussed from below, not from above, as the “men of the sixties” discussed 
it. For that reason, when you say left-leftist, right-wing, neoliberal, or class, 
alienation, totality, totalization, and so on, you seemingly know what those 
things are but I can have doubts precisely about such knowledge, not sup­
ported by experience and context. You are using the old names all over 
again, but you don’t indicate the reasons that would justify such a use of 
Marxist language. You seem to be already at the top, when in reality there 
is no eternal Marxism to which we can refer as if it were something known 
to everyone and cherished by everyone! I mean that Marxist terminology 
(as it is used today) throws into confusion the previously existing Marxist 
discourse. Inasmuch as it employs it too freely and in a headstrong man­
ner, you might say “in the dark.” Today we don’t have the Marxism that 
was so obvious in its premises and examples even in the “prosperous” 
times of the 1960s. But even then the knowledge of Marxism was being 
newly “reworked,” so as to reconcile the previous content of Marxist terms 
and concepts with new contexts and challenges. That was what led to all 
the trends of late Marxism, or more aptly, post-Marxism, its attempts to 
return to the Hegelian dialectic, but this time from the position of Ki­
erkegaard or Heidegger, or from the position of structuralist or poststruc­
turalist theory, for example. 
What does it mean to be a Marxist today? This talk is in some sense 
under the spell of that question, but can’t find the answer. In my own un­
derstanding of being a Marxist in these times, it doesn’t mean being a 
leftist (I do not think that leftism is a sign of adherence to Marxist teach­
ings). I in no way deny “your convictions,” nor do I aspire to change them. 
I will remind you of Lifshitz and his manifesto “Why Am I Not a Modernist ?” 
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and Andrei Bely’s text­testament “Why I Remain a Symbolist…” published 
after his death (1982). And, finally, the apocryphal Karl Marx statement, 
“Why Am I Not a Marxist?” Marxism today has probably been given many 
advantages compared to the fate of the Hegel­Marx­Kojève­Adorno 
school of thought, you might say that Marxism has conquered not as a 
new Utopia of the future but rather as the most comfortable form of tem­
porary deliverance from the pain and discomfort of the present. The new 
and rather “glamorous” Marxism is anti-revolutionary, bourgeois through 
and through, that is, it has no relation to the Marxism of either Lukács or 
Lifshitz. My sense is that if Marxism were even possible, it would be as a 
kind of aesthetic doctrine… But even that adventure is one Marxism has 
already been through… But would we feel “equal” if we were to be told 
that now everyone will again be poor, that there are not and will no longer 
be any rich people, did that mean that it was a just society? 
Alexei Penzin: I will perhaps permit myself a final comment. I did 
not, of course, have in mind a dogmatic “faith,” blindly copying the old 
terminology. What we are talking about is precisely how there can be a 
return to Marx under new conditions, where we are confronted rather 
with the ideological dogma of anticommunism, together with those 
same “contradictions” of capitalism, which after the Soviet collapse re­
turned with unprecedented and ominous, catastrophic force—in a world 
that, to all appearances, was supposed to be subordinate only to a kind of 
“post­historical” politics of knowledge and critical rationality. And this 
turn toward philosophies connected with the name of Marx affected not 
only a part of the post-Soviet generation, but in fact has been a com­
pletely international phenomenon since the early years of the twenty­
first century. You have done a beautiful job of explaining the reasons for 
your doubts as to whether we can use the “old” language and conceptual 
apparatus of Marxism or “Marxisms,” both from the point of view of a 
witness who came of age thrown into the “facticity” of Soviet experience 
and, naturally, from the point of view of your own political and philo­
sophical experience, reflected in your many outstanding works. Yet all 
the same, I would like to note that the generation who have begun once 
again to employ Marxist language—whether the post­Soviet generation 
here or their counterparts in the wider world—is involved in a fairly com­
plex process of reflection regarding the conditions governing the possi­
bility of using those terms. As I am unable here to develop this thesis in 
detail, I will merely refer you to one particular point. So, in my view, this 
reflection expressed itself not in a “faith” that grew out of subjective 
recalcitrance, but in an utterly distinct relationship to the inner tempo­
rality of the enormous history of radical thought and practice in the 
twentieth century—both Soviet and “Western.” The past was not imag­
ined as a completely closed or “dead” archive, open to exhaustive analy­
sis but in no way to being updated. Such a historicism, in its way abso­
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lute, was rather rejected, and other forms of relations to history, both 
philosophical and political, were sought out. This represents a certain 
kind of anti-historicism, and perhaps it is no less productive: only in a 
different period can the intellectual and political experience of the 
past—even if it was given in the forms of completely unglamorous Soviet 
“facticity” or its “doublethink”—be “redeemed” (as Benjamin would say), 
read anew and fulfilled. And Soviet thought, having historically been 
subjected to a double expulsion—both from inner Party dogma and from 
“Western Marxism”—only now, after being freed from this “double bind,” 
has a chance of becoming truly meaningful and radical. 
Moscow, Institute of Philosophy of Russian Academy of Sciences, 
March 20168
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